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Abstract-It is getting more common for two or more parties to 
jointly compute some statistics, say for marketing, by combining 
information on their private databases without disclosing the 
private data to the others. The core problem is usually known as 
secure multi-party computation (SMC). A number of solutions 
have been proposed. However, almost all of them assume a semi­
honest model which is unrealistic. On the other hand, protocols 
that work under the malicious model (all participating parties 
can be malicious) are usually complicated and expensive in terms 
of communication and computation. In this paper, we try to 
consider a more reasonable model, the hybrid security model, 
in which at least one party is semi-honest. We want to make 
sure that the malicious parties will not get the correct final 
result if they perform malicious behaviors. We propose a scheme 
to solve the two-party weighted average problem (WAP) under 
this hybrid security model. We also show that the scheme can 
be extended to work under the malicious model using any fair 
exchange scheme. We formally show that our schemes are secure. 
We also implemented the schemes and showed that our scheme 
under the hybrid security model is reasonably fast and efficient 
for practical use. 
Index Terms-Secure multi-party computation, weighted av­
erage problem, hybrid security model, privacy preservation, 
homomorphic encryption. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of information and communications 
technology, it is feasible to share data which is owned by 
different parties and stored in different locations. Sharing data 
for marketing or research purposes is getting more common. 
However, privacy is still a main concern. The following shows 
an example. A number of banks wish to jointly compute 
some statistics based on their transaction records to conduct 
a study for possible credit fraud behaviors. Although the 
banks are willing to cooperate with one another, they do not 
want to reveal the transaction records to other parties due to 
privacy policies, legal constrains or their own benefits. What 
we need is the ability to compute the desired statistics based 
on all transaction records for mining purposes without having 
actually sharing or disclosing any record [1]. 
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) provides a solution 
to this problem. SMC is first proposed by Yao [2] in 1986 and 
mainly concerns about the problem of evaluating a function 
based on the secret inputs from two or more parties. Roughly 
speaking, a protocol can be regarded as a SMC protocol if 
it satisfies the requirement that participating parties get no 
information about the inputs of other parties only based on the 
final result and the intermediate messages collected during the 
execution of the protocol. A formal definition will be given in 
Section 3. Generally speaking, there are two types of security 
models in SMC: semi-honest model and malicious model. In 
the semi-honest model, it is assumed that each party follows 
each step of the protocol, however, the adversary will attempt 
to infer additional information from the final result and the 
messages collected during execution. In the malicious model, 
the adversary can diverge arbitrarily from normal execution of 
the protocol. It has been proven that for any polynomial-time 
algorithm, there exists a polynomial-time secure protocol that 
achieves the same functionality under either semi-honest or 
malicious model [3]. Most protocols such as [4] and [5] are 
designed under the semi-honest model. Protocols under semi­
honest model are usually quite efficient but it is not realistic 
to assume that all adversaries are semi-honest [1] in practice. 
On the other hand, protocols designed for the malicious model 
are usually more complicated and with significant overheads 
on communications and computation. 
Our contributions: Meanwhile, it is also not necessary to 
assume that all adversaries are malicious. If all parties are 
malicious, it is not necessary to guarantee any of them to 
get the correct result. On the other hand, if there are some 
semi-honest parties, the protocol should guarantee that they 
are protected no matter how many malicious parties there are. 
There are other examples showing that this model is more 
realistic. Let us consider the common server-client model, 
usually the server is semi-honest if not being hacked but the 
clients are either semi-honest or malicious. In this paper, we 
propose to study this new model, the hybrid security model, 
under which we have two types of parties (both semi-honest 
and malicious). The formal definition of this hybrid security 
model is given in Section 3. 
Based on this hybrid security model, we study a funda­
mental problem in SMC, the two-party weighted average 
problem (WAP), in which the two parties want to compute 
the weighted sum of a set of values with each one holds a 
subset of these values and the corresponding weights. WAP 
was firstly discussed in [4] and is being applied in a variety 
of areas, such as clustering and decision tree building. Early 
works only discuss WAP under the semi-honest model. In 
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this paper, we propose a novel protocol to solve WAP under 
the hybrid security model. We also show how to extend the 
protocol to work under the malicious model using any fair 
exchange scheme. We implement the schemes and show that 
the perfonnance of our scheme under the hybrid security 
model is efficient and can be used in practical cases. 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we first describe a few exceptional behavior of participating 
parties which are not considered by our model, then followed 
by some basic concepts of homomorphic encryption which 
will be used in our protocol. The hybrid security model is 
formally defined in Section III. Our proposed protocol to solve 
WAP is described in details in Section IV. The analysis and 
evaluation of our schemes are given in Sections V and VI, 
respectively. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Secure Multi-Party Computation 
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC) was first proposed 
by Yao [2] as a Millionaire Problem and extended by [6]-[9]. 
[10] even proved that SMC is equivalent to requiring a secure 
computation. SMC mainly concerns about the problem of 
evaluating a function with two or more parties' private inputs 
such that after rwming the protocol, each party holds a share 
of the output and no additional information is revealed except 
what is implied directly by the parties' own input and output. 
As mentioned earlier, there are generally two main security 
models discussed in earlier works. They are the semi-honest 
model and the malicious model. We note that the followings 
cannot be handled by both models. 
I) Parties refuse to participate in the protocol. 
2) Parties using invalid input instead of their actual data. 
3) Parties abort the protocol prematurely. 
Without loss of generality, our proposed hybrid security 
model also does not take these into consideration. 
B. Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is a special type of encryption in 
which the result of applying a special algebraic operation on 
the plain text(s) can be obtained by applying another (can be 
different or the same) algebraic operation on the corresponding 
cipher text(s). Thus, even the user does not know the plain 
text(s), he/she can still obtain the result of applying that 
algebraic operation on the plain text(s). The fonnal definition 
of homomorphic encryption is as follows. 
Let E : R x X --+ Y be a probabilistic public key encryption 
function, where R, X and Yare finite domains identified with 
an initial subset of integers and D : Y --+ X be a private 
decryption function, such that V(r, x) E R x X, D(E(r, x)) = 
x. 
In this paper, we adapt Paillier's public key homomorphic 
encryption function [11], which has the following properties: 
1) The encryption function is additive homomorphic, 
which means that V(rl,xd, (r2,x2) E R x X, 
n (E(rl' xd, E(r2' X2)) = E(r3, Xl + X2), where r3 
can be computed from Xl, rl, X2 and r2 in polynomial 
time. 
2) The encryption function is semantically secure, which 
means that a set of cipher texts do not provide extra 
infonnation about the plain texts to the polynomial­
bounded computing power adversary. 
III. HYBRID SECURITY MODEL 
In this section, we provide the formal definition of the 
proposed hybrid security model. 
A. Definition 3.1 
Let a represent the set of parties who are defined in the 
semi-honest model and (3 represent the set of parties who are 
defined in the malicious model. The hybrid security model 
consists of at least one party belonging to a. Thus, the hybrid 
security model includes the semi-honest model as a subset. 
That is, protocol designed for the hybrid security model can 
be executed correctly even if all parties are semi-honest. 
Our hybrid security model can be considered as a trade-off 
between security and efficiency. This model can be used in 
several application scenarios such as the server-client scenario. 
Like the malicious model, there are several behaviors this 
model cannot handle. Let us recall them again here. 
1) Parties belonging to (3 refuse to participate in the pro­
tocol. 
2) Parties belonging to (3 use other input instead of their 
actual data. 
3) Parties belonging to (3 abort the protocol. 
B. Definition 3.2 
A protocol ¢ under the hybrid security model must satisfy 
the following requirements. 
1) Privacy: ¢ satisfies the security requirement of a semi­
honest secure multi-party (SSMC) protocol. 
2) Fairness: Parities who perform malicious behaviors can­
not get the correct final result. 
The formal definition of privacy is as follows: 
Let X and y be the inputs of the two parties respectively 
and both parties want to compute f(x, y). Further let II be 
a two-party protocol to compute f. The view of the first 
party after executing II can be defined as V I EW P (x, y) = 
(x, r, ml, ... ,mt ) , where r are the random bits generated by 
Party 1 and m I, . . .  ,mt is the sequence of messages received 
by Party 1. The view of Party 2 can be defined in the same 
way. 
II is said to privately compute f if there exists probabilistic 
polynomial-time algorithms S I and S2 such that 
Sl(x,f(x,y))x,y ==P VIEWP(x,y)x,y 
S2(X,f(X,y))x,y ==P V1EWf(x,y)x,y 
Here, ==P denotes statistically indistinguishable. 
- 678-
IV. OUR SOLUTIONS 
In this section, we firstly explain what the weighted average 
problem (WAP) is. Then we review the solution for solving 
the WAP under the semi-honest model as proposed in [4]. 
Next we discuss our proposed solutions for solving the same 
problem under the hybrid security and malicious models. 
1) The Weighted Average Problem: Weighted average, or 
weighted mean, is the average value of weighted data points 
where different data points contribute non-equally to the final 
average. We define it formally as follows. 
Input: {Xl, ... ,xn} and the weight of Xi is Wi where i E 
{I, ... , n} 
Output: x = L� a(Wi'Xi
) 
L'=l Wi 
Here, if {Xl, ... , xn} belong to two separate parties. They 
need to cooperate to calculate x, meanwhile each party still 
wants to keep their private data. In particular, we need to 
calculate the mean value of Alice's and Bob's inputs (see 
below) and at the same time without disclosing their private 
data to the counterpart. 
Input: 
Alice: {Xl, ... , xa} and the weight of Xi is W1i where i E 
{I, ... , a} 
Bob: {YI, ... , Yb} and the weight of Yj is w2j where j E 
{I, ... , b} 
Output: 
x-Y = L�-la
Wli'Xi+L!-l w2j'Yj 
Li=l Wli+Lj=l w2j 
Here, we only focus on the situation of the same weighted 
value of Xi and Yj, that is, Wli = w2j where i E {I, ... , a} 
and j E {I, ... , b}. Then, we can simplify the above formula 
of mUlti-party weighted average into xy = �tr where X 
is the sum value of {x I, ... , xa} and Y is the sum value 
of {YI, ... , Yb}. This is one kind of Multi-party Computation 
(MC). Furthermore, each participant here requires his / her 
private data not disclosed during the collaboration. Both of 
them want to get the value of �tr without disclosing the 
knowledge of X, a and Y, b, respectively, to the other party. 
This problem belongs to the Secure Multi-party Computation 
(SMC) category. 
2) Solving WAP under the semi-honest model: The prob­
lem of computing �tr has been proposed by [4]. However, 
their solution is not perfect since it can only guarantee its 
security under the semi-honest model, which assumes that 
participants follow the protocol from the beginning until the 
end. Thus, their scheme is open to attack by a malicious party 
easily. For completeness, we restate their solution as follows. 
1) Alice sends Bob: EA(x), EA(a) where EA(-) is an 
encryption function which is encryptable by both Alice 
and Bob but is only decryptable by Alice; 
2) Bob generates Zl and Z2 (suppose Zl = Z2), com­
putes EA(X)Zl, EA(a)Z2, and sends EA(ZIX + ZIY), 
EA(Z2a + Z2b) to Alice; 
3) Alice decrypts them and performs the division 
EA(ZIX + ZIY) in order to get (x + y)/(a + b). This is 
possible because Zl can be cancelled by Z2. 
In this solution, if Bob does not follow the protocol 
honestly, Alice cannot get the precise final answer after 
the execution of the protocol. Consider that Bob uses two 
different values, Zl and Z2, during Step 2. This will lead 
to an unfair consequence that Alice gets a wrong value 
of ZI(X + y)/(Z2(a + b)), but Bob gets a correct one by 
simply multiplying the answer by Z2/ZI. Therefore, we aim 
at improving this solution and propose a novel solution to 
guarantee that it is secure under the hybrid security model 
and under the malicious model. 
3) Solving WAP under hybrid security model: We propose 
a novel solution to solve WAP under the hybrid security model. 
The details of the solution is given below. 
1) Alice generates Zl and sends to Bob: EA(ZIX + a), 
EA(Zd where EA(-) is an encryption function which 
is encryptable by both Alice and Bob but is only 
decryptable by Alice; 
2) Bob generates Z2, computes EA(ZIZ2(X + y) + Z2(a + 
b)) and sends to Alice; 
3) Alice decrypts to obtain Z I Z2 (X + y) + Z2 (a + b) and 
sends EA(a) to Bob; 
4) Bob sends EA(Z2(a + b)) to Alice; 
5) Alice calculates A = ZIZ2(X + Y), B = Z2(a + b) and 
(x + y)/(a + b) = A/(BZI). 
Here we assume that Alice is semi-honest and she will send 
Bob the final result (x + y)/(a + b). Bob can be malicious but 
if he performs malicious behavior he can not get the correct 
final result from Alice. For example, if Bob puts another value 
Z�, instead of Z2 into EA(Z2(a + b)), he cannot recover the 
final value on his own since he does not know the value of 
Zl. 
4) Solving WAP under the malicious model: Next we 
extend our solution above to work under the malicious model. 
Our solution consists of two phases. 
1) Computation phase: Compute the prescribed function 
f(x,y,a,b) = (x + y)/(a + b) separately and privately. 
2) Verification phase: Verify whether other parties have put 
correct values during the computation phase. 
We aim at meeting two requirements: 
1) Privacy: Each party cannot compute additional informa­
tion (other than its own private data) from the messages 
received during execution. 
2) Verifiable: Parties putting fabricated value will be de­
tected during the verification phase. 
To enhance readability, we sununarize our solution in 
Table I and Table II and we will analyze it in details in the 
next section. In the table, we denote E A (.) as an encryption 
function which is encryptable by both Alice and Bob but is 
only decryptable by Alice and denote E B (-) as an encryption 
function which is encryptable by both Alice and Bob but is 
only decryptable by Bob. Basically the computation phase 
includes a total of five steps. In the first four steps, each of the 
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two parties includes one option for the other party. Meanwhile, 
the order of these two options will not affect the fairness 
between participants and no one can disclose any private data 
from the information obtained. 
In this protocol, Alice chooses random nwnbers Z 1 and Z3 
while Bob chooses random numbers Z2 and Z4. Since Bob has 
no idea about Zl, he cannot change the coefficients of x and 
y. Otherwise, he cannot eliminate the effect of this change. 
So does Alice. Also if Bob intends to change the coefficients 
of a and b, he still cannot succeed. It is because in the 
fourth round, Alice will use whatever Bob sends back as the 
denominator after decryption. For the fair exchange scheme 
in the verification phase, any existing gradual release timed 
commitments scheme [12], [13] can be adopted to ensure that 
both Alice and Bob obtains the value m from the other party 
at about the same time. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In Sections V-A and V-B, we provide the security analysis 
for the protocol of WAP under the hybrid security model. In 
Section V-C, we show the security analysis under the malicious 
model. 
A. Privacy preservation 
Intuitively, if neither of Alice nor Bob can infer the private 
data of another party (y, b for Alice and x, a for Bob), we can 
conclude that the protocol for solving the weighted average 
problem (WAP), PWAP, is privacy preserving. 
The sequence of messages which Alice gets is ZlZ2(X + 
y) + Z2(a + b) and Z2(a + b), and Alice knows the values x, 
a and ZI. Therefore, we can form two equations: 
{ 
ZlZ2(X + y) + Z2(a + b) = C1 
Z2(a + b) = C2 
Alice cannot infer the value of the three variables y, band 
Z2 from the two equations due to the theory of linear algebra. 
The sequence of messages which Bob gets is E(Z IX + 
a), E(ZI), E(a) and Bob knows the values y, b and Z2. 
Bob cannot infer any knowledge about Z 1, x and a since the 
encryption algorithm is assumed to be semantically secure. 
According to Definition 3.2, 
! V I EW .ft'rc� P (x, a) 
= (x, a, ZIZ2(X + y) + Z2(a + b), Z2(a + b)) 
VIEW
PWAP(y b) Bob ' 
= (y, b, EA(ZI(X + a)), EA(ZI), EA(a)) 
Let Z' be a random number, therefore, we define that 
Sl(x,a, m) as follows: 
(X a Z' Z E.±1!. + Z' Z') " 1 a+b ' 
VIEW.ft'rc�P(x,a) and Sl(x,a, m) are statistically in-
distinguishable. The reason is that Z2 is a random number, 
therefore, Z2(a + b) is a random number as well. Since the 
encryption scheme is semantically secure, Bob cannot gain 
extra information from the encrypted values E(Z 1 * (x + a)), 
E(Zl) and E(a). In other words, with the randomly chosen 
messages x', a' and Z�, Bob cannot distinguish between 
VIEW;:"AP(y, b) and (y, b, E(Z�(x' + a')), E(ZU, E(a')) 
with more than negligible probability. 
Therefore, we can conclude that Pw AP privately computes 
(x + y)j(a + b). 
B. Fairness 
In this hybrid model, the behavior of Alice is defined in 
semi-honest model, which means that Alice will follow each 
step of the protocol correctly but want to infer the private 
values of Bob from the message she receives. The behavior 
of Bob is defined in malicious model, which means that Bob 
will not only try to infer the private values of Alice, but also 
will abort the protocol or put several wrong values during the 
protocol so as to gain some advantage. 
A protocol will work under hybrid model if: 
I) Neither of the parties participated in the protocol can 
gain any knowledge about the private value of another 
party. 
2) The malicious party cannot get the correct final result if 
he performs malicious behavior. 
Pw AP has already been proven to meet the first condition, 
and we will analyze whether it meets the second condition as 
well. 
If Bob aborts the protocol in any step, Alice will not send 
the final value (x+y)j(a+b). As a result, Bob cannot compute 
it from the encrypted values he receives since the encryption 
scheme is assumed to be semantically secure. 
If Bob sends y' or b' instead of y or b to Alice, he cannot 
recover the correct value (x +y)j(a +b) from (x +y')j(a +b') 
since Bob is lack of the knowledge about x and a. 
If Bob sends E(a + b)Z' instead of E(a + b)Z to Alice, 
then in the last step, he will receive ;, m + zi,-f,' instead 
of m. Bob cannot recover this value since he is lack of the 
knowledge about Z 1. 
Therefore, we can conclude that Bob will not get the 
final correct result under the condition that he performs any 
malicious behavior. Pw AP will work under the hybrid security 
model according to the analysis above. 
C. Security of our solution under malicious model 
The malicious protocol can be viewed as the two way 
protocols under hybrid security model. Therefore, the proof 
of the privacy preservation property is quite similar to that 
in Section V-A. We mainly concern about the problem that 
whether the verification phase works. 
In this protocol, the inputs of Alice are x, a, Z 1, Z3 and 
that of Bob are y, b, Z2, Z4. We guarantee that: 
I) Malicious parties will not get the correct final result if 
he puts a wrong value during the protocol, or 
2) The malicious behavior that lead another party to get an 
incorrect final result can be detected in the verification 
phase. 
Let us take Alice as an example. If Alice puts incorrect 
values x', a' into EA(ZlX' + a') or EA(a'), then obviously, 
she will not get the correct final result. 
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TABLE I 
COMPUTATION PHASE 
Alice Bob 
f- sends EB(Z2 . Y + b), and EB(Z2) 
sends EA (a) ---+ 
f- sends EB(b) 
gets WAPA = m gets WAPB = m 
TABLE II 
VERIFICATION PHASE 
Alice 
Fair Exchange Scheme 
sends M = �---+ a±b 
compares M and N 
Recall that in the verification phase, if Alice follows each 
step correctly, then she can send the correct value of m to 
Bob in the verification phase. For Alice, she cannot cheat in the 
verification phase. Since if she performs malicious behavior in 
the computation phase, she cannot send the right value to Bob. 
We analyze this protocol step by step to prove that 
this verification phase will work. If Alice puts x', a' into 
EB(Z2Z3(X' + y) + Z3(a' + b) or EB(Z3(a' + b)) to Bob, 
Bob will compute a wrong final value in the computation 
phase. However, since the encryption function is assumed to be 
semantically secure, Alice has no knowledge about the wrong 
final value of Bob. Therefore, she cannot fabricate the value 
to convince that they have the same final result and Bob can 
verify this type of behavior in the verification phase. 
If Alice puts a different value for Z3, say Z3 into 
EB(Z3(a' + b)), the final value Bob computes becomes 
m + z;:�� . However, since Alice has no knowledge about 
Z2, she cannot fabricate and send the value to convince Bob 
that the final results of them are the same. 
The verification phase will work for Bob under the same 
reason. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We implement all the protocols discussed using Java which 
is executed on a desktop computer with 2 GHz processor and 
3 GB memory. For the homomorphic encryption functions, we 
adopt an open source Paillier library and we set the key size 
for key generation to 1,024 bits. We vary the data size of x, 
y, a and b from 100 bits to 1,000 bits in steps of 100 bits. 
For each data size N (bits), we random pick 4 integers in the 
range [0,2N) and assign them to x, y, a and b respectively. 
We then input these 4 values into each of the three protocols 
(under the semi-honest, the hybrid security and the malicious 
models) and measure the total processing time. We then repeat 
this process by 100 times to obtain an average value. We ignore 
any communication time in this experiment because it should 
be small enough as compared to processing time in today's fast 
Bob 
f- sends N = � a±b 
compares M and N 
� 3000 [==========================:===::==�==� i 2500 
� 2000 - -
u_ L =��==�==�====�==�==���====�==i 
.s � 1500 t: 
� � 1000 �Semi.boDest Model 
.5j 500 ---Hybrid Security Model 1 � __ � __ � __ � ____ � __ � ____ �M _. li_· cI�ou_sM_o_de�I � � 
100 200 300 400 500 600 
Data Size (bits) 
700 800 900 1000 
Fig. I. Processing Time Complexity vs. Data S ize 
network connections. The results are summarized in Table III 
and Figure 1. 
From Table III and Figure 1, we can see that longer 
processing time is required as the data size increases. If we 
compare the processing time for semi-honest model and hybrid 
security model, we find that the processing time for hybrid 
security model is 8.6% to 7.1 % more than that for semi-honest 
model as the data size increasing from 100 bits to 1000 bits. 
This is reasonable as our solution under hybrid security model 
involves about the same number of cryptographic functions as 
that under the semi-honest model. 
If we further compare the processing time for the hybrid 
security model and the malicious model, we find that the 
processing time for the malicious model is 56.9% to 67.6% 
more than that for the hybrid security model as the data size 
increasing from 100 bits to 1000 bits. This is because our 
solution under the malicious model involves almost a double 
of cryptographic functions as that under the hybrid security 
model. 
To conclude, our solution under the hybrid security model 
provides a more secure environment for solving the WAP but 
yet the increase in processing time is only marginal (at most 
8.6%). Our solution under malicious model demonstrates that 
such a fully secure environment is possible. However, there is 
still room to improve the complexity of our solutions and we 
will leave it as our future work. 
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TABLE III 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Data Size (bits) Complexity (msec) 
(Semi-honest Model) 
Complexity (msec) 
(Hybrid Security Model) 
Complexity (msec) 
(Malicious Model) 
100 1236.7 
200 1298.2 
300 1333.6 
400 1364.5 
500 1401.3 
600 1444.2 
700 1463.4 
800 1492.9 
900 1529.8 
1000 1568.7 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we revisit the weighted average problem 
(WAP). This problem is known as the secure multi-party 
computation (SMC) problem and a number of solutions have 
been proposed in the research community. However, almost all 
of them assume a semi-honest model which is unreasonable in 
general. While not a proof, protocols under malicious model 
are more complicated and expensive. In view of this, we 
propose a novel hybrid security model in this paper. We also 
propose schemes to solve the WAP under hybrid security 
and malicious models. We formally prove that our scheme 
can achieve privacy preservation. Through implementation, 
we show that our novel scheme under hybrid security model 
is comparable to that under semi-honest model in terms of 
processing time complexity. In the future, we will enhance 
our solution under the malicious model and will adapt our 
solutions to some interesting problems in the community such 
as privacy preserving decision tree construction. 
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